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Intelligent agent technologies are increasing the potential capacity for systems to behave 
more autonomously and are enabling more advanced human-autonomy teaming.  
For instance, future applications of human-autonomy teaming for the command and 
control of unmanned vehicles are now under consideration. This would involve a shift 
from a supervisory control approach to a teaming structure. These two approaches, 
instantiated as the task division and relationship between a human operator and a 
teammate, were empirically examined. The team’s composition, either human-human or 
human-autonomy, was also considered. A control station that supports single operator 
management of multiple simulated unmanned vehicles performing a base defense mission 
was employed along with a task management interface to support coordination and team 
cognition. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed experimental design was used to evaluate operator-driven 
(supervisory control) and role-driven (teaming) team structures (within-subjects), across 
two levels of mission complexity (within-subjects), by both human-human teams and 
human-autonomy teams (between-subjects). Twenty-four participants completed four 30-
minute trials, during which they worked with their teammate to complete a series of 
mission tasks. The role-driven team structure resulted in increased team performance on 





Composition but the human-human teams resulted in a greater number of 
communications, and the teammate was rated higher in terms of trust and reliability. 
These results indicate that a teaming approach between human operators and autonomy 
can be beneficial, however, the interfaces need to support teammate interactions and 
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Increasing autonomous capabilities are being developed for a wide range of 
domains, such as health care, robotics, and aviation. This has led to an ever-increasing 
focus on understanding how best to integrate autonomy for various applications. The 
stance on best practices has evolved along with autonomous systems, with the focus first 
on increasing the level of automation (Sheridan & Verplank, 1978) and then expanding to 
the interdependence between humans and autonomy such as coactive design (Johnson, 
Bradshaw, Feltovich, Jonker, Van Riemsdijk, & Sierhuis, 2014). In general, it is now 
understood that merely increasing autonomy is not enough to create an effective human-
autonomy system (Endsley, 2017).  
In the domain of command and control (C2), autonomous capabilities are driving 
a shift from multiple operators controlling a single unmanned vehicle (UV) to a single 
operator controlling multiple, heterogeneous UVs (United States Department of Defense, 
2011). The autonomy does not replace the human but instead changes the role of the 
operator from a pilot (as vehicle flight control can now be fulfilled by the autonomy) to 
that of a manager; being responsible for assigning high-level taskings to vehicles and 
monitoring the situation in order to respond to unexpected events (Spriggs, Warfield, 
Calhoun, and Ruff, 2010). This places an increased need for decision support 
technologies to assist the new role of the operator.  
Many current decision support technologies utilize a supervisory control approach 





output a solution for operator approval (Chen, Barnes, & Harper-Scarini, 2010). The 
application of advanced intelligent agent capabilities to more complex and dynamic task 
environments has led to an interest in research looking at how to support teaming 
between human operators and autonomous systems (e.g., Christoffersen & Woods, 2002; 
Bradshaw, Feltovich, Johnson, Bunch, Breedy, Eskridge, & Uszok, 2008; Johnson et al., 
2014a), whereby working together an operator-agent team can take advantage of the 
benefits of both the human operator and autonomous agent.  
This research considers the envisioned future where there is a shift from the 
current supervisory approaches with semi-autonomous systems to more of a peer-to-peer 
teaming approach, whereby the operator and autonomous agent team members work 
interdependently, taking on shared roles and responsibilities in task completion and 
monitoring. The main objective is to compare two team structures in order to gain a better 
understanding of how human and autonomous agents can work together as an effective, 
well-situated team. 
Why Teaming? 
Effective teamwork is essential for achieving reliable operations in environments 
that are hypercomplex, dynamic, and time-compressed, such as military C2 (Baker, Day, 
& Salas, 2006). Teaming enables members to share the workload while monitoring work 
behaviors such that individual expertise can be utilized and developed by other members. 
The United States Secretary of Defense, in describing the third US offset strategy (Work, 
2015), stated that human-autonomy collaboration is a building block that could support 





shown to be numerous, spanning across domains, and it will be important to consider as 
teams are augmented with autonomy (Johnson & Vera, 2019).  
Entirely human teams have previously utilized automation to enhance capabilities 
for decades, ranging from large scale manufacturing to daily activities in the home. 
Humans and autonomy working together as a team can result in performance outcomes 
that are greater than either working independently (e.g., Marble, Bruemmer, Few, & 
Dudenhoeffer, 2004). Freestyle chess competitions, which allow teams to consist of any 
number and combination of humans and/or computers, have demonstrated that an 
amateur chess player teaming with an intelligent system can defeat expert players and 
sophisticated systems that are working individually (Thompson, 2013). In the domain of 
multi-UV control, teaming with autonomy can result in tasks being completed quicker 
and more effectively (Draper et al., 2018) 
Simply adding ‘autonomy’ does not mean it will be inherently beneficial. Roth, 
Bennett, and Woods (1987) demonstrated that the conditions under which an intelligent 
system is utilized, and the role of the human could have an effect on performance 
outcomes, especially in novel situations. Furthermore, if the integration of autonomous 
capabilities is done inappropriately, it can have dire consequences. There are numerous 
examples throughout history of improper integration of automation or breakdowns in 
teaming that have led to undesirable outcomes. Recently, the company Amazon has been 
a large driver in the field of autonomous developments; however, twenty-four Amazon 
workers were hospitalized after an autonomous machine, designed to work alongside 





2018). Since that incident, Amazon has dismissed the idea that autonomous machines 
will be able to do the majority of the work any time soon (Bose, 2019).  
Even so, attempts have been made to have teams composed of entirely 
autonomous members, but outcomes have only further demonstrated the need for joint 
human-autonomy teams. A hotel in Japan, Henn na (meaning “Strange”), was created to 
be the world’s first hotel staffed almost entirely by autonomous robots. However, half the 
staff ended up being replaced by humans because it quickly became obvious that the 
hotel would not survive with autonomy alone (Gale & Muchizuki, 2019). Autonomous 
systems, even with increased capabilities, still work best when paired with humans (Hof, 
2016). 
There are still many challenges to integrating autonomy as part of a team. 
Increased autonomous capabilities need to be taken advantage of in a way that supports 
teaming to create efficient and reliable outcomes. This includes understanding important 
aspects of teaming, such as how to enable mutual goal setting, shared awareness 
maintenance, & effective communication/coordination (Zacharias, 2019). The identified 
key team components then need to be supported by the system and interface design 
(McDermott, Dominguez, Kasdaglis, Ryan, Trahan, & Nelson, 2018). 
Creating a Well-Situated Team 
Shifting to a teaming approach changes the questions from “how much should we 
let the autonomy do?” to “how do we create a well-situated team that takes advantage of 
both the operator and agent in order to most effectively handle the complex, dynamic 
problem space?”. The operator effectively collaborating with an autonomous teammate 





Capitalizing on the unique capabilities of both team members can create a well-situated 
human-autonomy team capable of handling complex, dynamic, novel situations (e.g., 
Shaw, Emfield, Garcia, de Visser, Miller, Parasuraman, & Fern, 2010).  
Existing teaming literature has addressed various aspects of effective teams. Since 
human-autonomy teaming is a relatively new concept, the majority of published teaming 
literature is focused on human-human teams. Of the research that is specifically focused 
on creating effective human-autonomy teams, much is theoretical in nature (e.g., 
Johnson, Bradshaw, Hoffman, Feltovich, & Woods, 2014; Klein, Woods, Bradshaw, 
Hoffman, & Feltovich, 2004), while others look at human teams completing a task and 
then make implications for human-autonomy teams (e.g., Lyons, Hoffman, Sadler, Van 
Able, & Wilkins, 2018; Shah & Breazeal, 2010). For these reasons, a variety of human-
human and human-autonomy research was reviewed.  
In the large body of research looking at different aspects of effective teams, of 
varying composition and in a wide range of domains, many factors have been shown to 
have a significant influence on team performance (e.g., DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus, 
2010; Urban, Bowers, Monday, & Morgan, 1995). Three key components of teams will 
now be discussed to shed light on those aspects which make a team well-situated: 
communication and coordination, team cognition, and team structure.  
Communication and coordination. An overarching theme of the teaming 
literature is the importance of successful communication and coordination to achieve 
productive teamwork (e.g., Kleinman & Serfaty, 1989; Michan & Rodger, 2000; Wilson, 
Salas, Priest & Andrews, 2007). Being able to effectively exchange information is vital 





teams communicate, and the effect on team performance; they have found that teams that 
implicitly coordinate by anticipating the teammate’s needs and exchanging the required 
information yield superior performance to those that only trade information upon request 
(Entin & Serfaty, 1999; Shah & Breazeal, 2010).  
Just as in human teams, it is important for human-autonomy teams to be able to 
communicate and coordinate in order to be successful (Bradshaw et al., 2008; Johnson et 
al., 2014b). However, human-autonomy teams face different challenges when it comes to 
communication and coordination, such as, while great advancements have been made in 
natural language processing, systems are still not as capable as a human teammate. There 
currently is a lack of language technologies that support articulation work that is 
regularly found in human-human teams when performing task management (Rothwell & 
Shalin 2017). This means that communication, which occurs naturally in human-human 
teams, now presents a design challenge for human-autonomy teams. Moreover, there are 
additional considerations, such as how much and what type of information the autonomy 
should share to enhance team performance without causing information overload and 
degrading information retrieval time (Harbers, Jonker & Van Riemsdijk, 2012).  
Additionally, autonomous teammates are not as limited in terms of the amount of 
information that can be processed relative to that of a human teammate. This has led 
some researchers to become interested in creating human-autonomy teams that coordinate 
effectively by focusing on predictability, observability, and directability of team members 
(Bradshaw et al., 2008; Johnson, Feltovich, & Bradshaw, 2008; Klein et al., 2004). This 
would allow the human operator to better understand what the autonomous teammate is 





operator to intervene when needed, such as in cases when the autonomy may have 
incomplete information. Some of this can be supported through interface design (Kilgore 
& Voshell, 2014), but it is still necessary to develop agents that can support these 
interactions (Johnson et al., 2014b).  
Team Cognition. A critical factor in developing effective teams is the emergent 
collection of cognitive processes referred to as team cognition (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 
2001; Salas & Fiore, 2004). Teaming research spans various team cognition constructs, 
such as shared mental models, transactive memory, and shared cognition. (A meta-
analysis of team cognition literature completed by DeChurch & Mesmer-Magnus (2010) 
included a list of 54 different terms used to describe team cognition constructs.) Based on 
a review of their work and other literature, it was summarized that team cognition is 
represented by two main categories: task knowledge and team knowledge (DeChurch & 
Mesmer-Magnus, 2010; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; 
Smith-Jentsch, Mathieu & Kraiger, 2005).  
Task knowledge is related to the features of the team’s tasks, such as 
understanding the tools/equipment available, the task objective, and constraints. Task 
knowledge can be further broken down into: 1) status information and intentions 
(knowledge of what tasks are currently being addressed, which have been completed, and 
whether assistance is needed), 2) knowledge and skills (what knowledge and skills 
teammates have that are relevant for the task at hand, e.g., who can and is best suited to 
complete various tasks), and 3) task mental model (knowledge of the constraints of the 
task and the strategy for completing the task). On the other hand, team knowledge 





themselves, including their knowledge, skills, status, and intentions. This can be broken 
down into knowledge of  1) the roles and responsibilities of each team member (who is 
responsible for completing which task, either currently or in the future) and 2) 
information sources and flow (which team member has the information or is responsible 
for providing the needed information, and how the information is shared).  
Teammates having shared team and task mental models have been shown to 
influence the team’s processes positively and have resulted in increased overall team 
performance (e.g., Mathieu et al., 2000). However, effective communication and 
coordination among teammates are needed for team cognition to improve performance 
(Mathieu et al., 2000; Jonker, Van Riemsdijk, & Vermeulen, 2011).  
Although the majority of team cognition research has focused on human-human 
teams it has been argued that the concept of shared mental models is also relevant for 
human-autonomy teams (Atkinson, Clancey, & Clark, 2014; Jonker et al., 2011; Ososky, 
Schuster, Jentsch, Fiore, Shumaker, Lebiere & Stentz, 2012). Since having the 
appropriate system and teammate understanding could also help the human operator 
coordinate more effectively with an autonomous agent (Espinosa, Kraut, Slaughter, 
Lerch, Herbsleb & Mockus, 2002), it will be important for the human operator to have 
sufficient training as well as experience working with the system in order to develop 
accurate team and task mental models. 
Another approach to support team cognition, as well as account for deficiencies in 
human-autonomy communication, is through providing transparency and observability. 
Human operators and autonomy need to understand their teammate’s status, intentions, 





especially difficult challenge with human-autonomy teams since there is often a 
disconnect between how a human would reason about something and the reasoning done 
by an intelligent agent. Currently, there are approaches being explored to provide 
transparency, for example, explainable AI (Artificial Intelligence; Doran, Schulz, & 
Besold, 2017) and enhancing representations in the interface (Kilgore & Voshell, 2014). 
Team Structure. The team’s structure is commonly referred to as “the division of 
the team’s work requirements into subtasks, which are assigned to individual team 
members or subteams” (Urban et al., 1995, p. 125). It is important to have a structure in 
place that helps the team meet its goals. However, the ‘best’ structure depends on the 
team’s task work, overall goal, and capabilities of the team members (Johnson and Vera, 
2019). In order to establish a relationship between teammates that is most effective, there 
is a need to understand how the structure of the team can influence team perceptions and 
performance (e.g., Lyons et al., 2018; Walliser, Mead, & Shaw, 2017). Various human-
human teams have been compared in terms of the division of information and 
capabilities, with their findings indicating that various team structures can result in 
performance differences (e.g., Walliser, et al., 2017; Urban et al. 1995). However, often, 
there is no clear ‘best’ structure but instead trade-offs of the various approaches.  
Human-human teaming research has particularly shown that a non-hierarchical 
team structure can result in better team performance than a hierarchical structure, such as 
in situations where quick responses are critical (e.g., Bowers, Urban & Morgan, 1992). 
However, the team’s task can influence the most effective structure. In a review of U.S. 
Navy nuclear aircraft carriers and air traffic control systems, La Porte & Concolini (1998) 





environment, which was adequate for responses during low and moderate demand. 
However, in high stressed situations, the organization shifted towards a flatter, 
decentralized control structure, which allowed for adaptability and flexibility. 
Hierarchical and non-hierarchical are not the only differentiation to be made about team 
structure; how the tasks are divided is another consideration.  
A distinction between functional (role-based, with teammates having individual 
roles but also working together collaboratively to accomplish tasks) versus divisional 
(territory-specific, where teammates work individually in a defined area towards a shared 
goal) team structure has also been made (Hollenbeck, 2000). These two team structures, 
along with workload, were evaluated in a C2 environment by Jobidon, Breton, Rousseau, 
& Tremblay (2006). Their results showed the effects of a workload transition. The 
divisional team’s performance was not affected by an increase in workload, but the 
functional team’s performance significantly declined over time with an increase in 
workload, even though it was faster than the divisional team at detecting new events.  
Coordination requirements can also delineate team structures. MacMillan, Entin 
& Serfaty (2004) looked at how team structure (defined by both the team's tasks and the 
allocation of task responsibilities to individuals on the team) influences coordination 
requirements, which in turn influences the need for communication between team 
members. An optimized team structure was developed that divided tasks in such a way as 
to reduce coordination requirements while balancing workload across team members. 
This was compared to a traditional team structure developed by subject matter experts 
(SMEs), which divided tasks such that similar resources were controlled by the same 





mission. Their research indicated that the optimized team structure not only reduced the 
need for coordination but also resulted in more efficient communication (higher 
anticipation ratio) as well as superior team performance (based on the quality of mission 
task completion and teamwork skills) compared to the SME’s traditional, resource-based 
team structure.  
The studies mentioned above were focused on entirely human teams. In contrast, 
the present study dealt with the structure of human-autonomy teams. Specifically, how 
humans team with autonomy in the form of intelligent agent capabilities. These 
intelligent agent capabilities are limited, such that the autonomy cannot perform all the 
actions of an equal teammate as would be required for a divisional or resource-based 
team structure. Therefore, a team structure based on the division of territory or resources 
was not examined. Rather, the current effort focused on looking at the costs and benefits 
of an ‘operator-driven’ team structure compared to a ‘role-driven’ team structure.  
For both team structures, a control approach referred to as ‘playbook’ was 
employed that was originally designed to support task delegation in a hierarchical team 
structure, similar to a supervisor delegating tasks to a subordinate (Miller and 
Parasuraman, 2007). The Playbook is analogous to a sports team’s book of plays, where a 
coach can make a quick play call, and the players know the actions they should perform. 
Using this approach, the operator can call a play, and the UVs will complete predefined 
taskings based on the play that was called (e.g., calling a ‘Point Inspect’ will reroute a 
vehicle and steer the sensor to the designated location). Play calling allows for the 
system's behavior to not be strictly scripted but instead enables flexible action within 





Operator-driven vs. role-driven team structure.  The present study included an 
operator-driven team structure where a human operator received all tasking requirements 
upfront and then decided which tasks to delegate to an autonomous teammate and which 
tasks to complete personally. The operator completed knowledge-based behaviors and 
delegated high-level taskings (e.g., respond to a suspicious vehicle), and the system 
performed the necessary steps to complete the task (e.g., call the appropriate play(s)). The 
autonomous teammate was able to complete rule-based behaviors (Rasmussen, 1983), 
which were based on a set of predetermined solutions for specific events.  
In contrast, the present study also included a role-driven structure that required 
each team member (the operator and autonomous teammate) to fulfill task roles based on 
respective expertise and skills. This team structure was decentralized: the teammate 
automatically began addressing a set of events and calling certain play types without first 
having tasks and plays associated with those events being delegated to the other 
teammate.  
It is important to note that the autonomous teammate had the same capabilities in 
both the role-driven and the operator-driven team structures. However, in the role-driven 
team structure, the operator did not spend time determining which tasks to assign to the 
agent since the agent automatically completed taskings it was capable of, per the 
predetermined role-assignment.  
Hypotheses. The main goal of this research was to investigate the implications of 
team structure moving from a supervisory control approach (Operator-driven) to a 
teaming configuration (Role-driven). Specifically of interest were the effects of team 





was measured by task completion (number of tasks completed), task accuracy (how 
accurately tasks were completed), and task proficiency (how quickly tasks were 
completed).  
Taking into consideration previous findings of the research literature on human-
human teams and human-autonomy teaming, several hypotheses were developed 
regarding the expected differences between the Operator-driven and Role-driven team 
structures. Since the Operator-driven team structure requires the operator to determine 
and complete task assignments to the teammate, it was expected that this would use up 
more of the operator’s attentional and cognitive resources, leaving fewer resources and 
time for the operator to complete their own tasks. Therefore, it was hypothesized that this 
would cause the number of tasks completed overall to be lower with the Operator-driven 
structure, as seen with teams when using similar hierarchical structures (e.g., Bowers, 
Urban & Morgan, 1992). It was also hypothesized, for similar reasons and due to the 
teammate being required to wait on the operator to assign tasks before they can begin 
completing them, that the overall completion speed would be slower with the Operator-
driven team structure.  
Hypothesis 1. Fewer tasks will be completed with the Operator-driven 
team structure compared to the Role-driven team structure. 
Hypothesis 2. Tasks will be completed slower with the Operator-driven 
team structure compared to the Role-driven team structure. 
However, the operator is more involved in task assignments with the Operator-
driven team structure, and tasks may be more effectively assigned to the autonomous 





current situational demands (e.g., Ruff, Narayanan, & Draper, 2002). Therefore, it was 
hypothesized that there would be an increase in task accuracy and the operator’s 
situational awareness with this team structure.  
Hypothesis 3. Tasks will be completed more accurately with the 
Operator-driven team structure compared to the Role-
driven team structure. 
On the other hand, it was hypothesized that the Role-driven team structure would 
allow operators to take advantage of the automatic task assignment and relieve workload 
(Wickens, Li, Santamaria, Sebok, & Sarter, 2010), thereby freeing them to address novel 
and unexpected situations using knowledge-based behaviors (Rasmussen, 1983). 
However, the increased automation with the Role-driven team structure was hypothesized 
to result in a cost to situational awareness since the operator will be less involved in the 
assignment and completion of tasks (Endsley, 1996).  
Hypothesis 4. The Operator-driven team structure will result in increased 
workload compared to the Role-driven team structure. 
Hypothesis 5. The Operator-driven team structure will result in greater 
situation awareness compared to the Role-driven team 
structure. 
Mission complexity considerations. The uncertain, dynamic, and resource-
constrained environment of C2 domains creates complexity that has to be addressed by 
teams. Coping with these increases in complexity requires expertise in diverse areas and 





working together (Cannon-Bowers, Oser, & Flanagan, 1992). The addition of 
autonomous agents can help relieve some of the workload caused by the complexity, but 
the addition of the interaction with these agents adds its own complexity that needs to be 
addressed. The collaboration between team members when addressing concurrent tasks, 
especially when there is uncertainty, can cause breakdowns in coordination that can 
negatively impact team performance (Xiao, Hunter, Mackenzie, Jefferies, Horst, & 
Group, 1996). The trade-offs for different team structures may fluctuate in relation to the 
current level of workload faced by the team (Jobidon et al., 2006). Although one team 
structure may be effective under low workload, it may fall apart when the workload is 
high (Urban, Weaver, Bowers, & Rhodenizer, 1996). Therefore, situation complexity was 
varied in the present study at two levels: low Mission Complexity and high Mission 
Complexity. It was hypothesized that increases in workload would amplify differences 
between the two team structures. 
Human-Human vs. Human-Autonomy Teams 
Although the research focused on human-human teams has produced a wealth of 
knowledge (e.g., Peters, Romigh, Bradley, & Raj, 2017), there is still a need to 
understand how human-autonomy teams differ from human-human teams in order to be 
able to apply the lessons learned (Endsley, 2017). Currently, empirical research 
comparing human-autonomy teams to human-human teams (i.e., looking at what makes a 
human-autonomy team effective) is sparse. Results to date indicate that there can be 
differences in performance with regard to teaming interactions, trust, and team 
composition (e.g., Endsley, 2017; Madhavan & Wiegmann, 2007). Thus, the present 





completing tasks in a complex work environment. Results from this research will also 
inform what system advancements are needed to move towards a more peer-to-peer 
teaming of humans with autonomy.  
Interface Design  
Regardless of the team’s composition, teaming requires interaction and 
collaboration; therefore, interfaces that support human-autonomy teaming are vital for the 
team to succeed (Bornstein, 2015; United States Air Force, 2019). The interface between 
humans and autonomy provides a means of communication and can support team 
cognition through the display of team and task information. Just like adding autonomy 
isn’t enough, simply having an interface isn’t either. It needs to be designed to present 
relevant information in a meaningful way. 
Three Mile Island is a well-known example of how inappropriate interface design 
between the human operator and automation can cause potentially catastrophic results, 
with the indicators in the nuclear power plant’s control room contributing to the partial 
meltdown. The issue of appropriate interface design is still very relevant today. Instead of 
having too much data, the Boeing 737 Max accidents have been at least partially 
attributed to the lack of interface indications, with only an optional indication available at 
an extra financial cost (Gelles & Kitroeff, 2019).  
Previously, design efforts focused on how to enable an operator to best control 
automation. However, increased capabilities have prompted a refocusing on humans and 
autonomy collaborating together. This will involve additional design considerations, such 
as supporting human-autonomy communication, coordination, and team cognition 





ensure that the whole system is considered in order to support these factors in a 
meaningful way (Bennett & Flach, 2011). 
As part of this research, a task management interface was designed and 
implemented to support communications, coordination and team cognition by providing 
team and task mental model information about what tasks need to completed, task 
assignment, and teammate intentions and status (Frost, Calhoun, Ruff, Bartik, Behymer, 
Spriggs, & Buchanan, 2019). An initial collaborative prototype was shown to be an 
effective approach in laboratory & live tests (e.g., Draper et al., 2018; Bartik et al., in 
press). The details of the task management interface, along with other supporting 
interfaces that were designed using EID (Calhoun, Ruff, Behymer & Frost, 2018), are 
discussed later.  
Summary 
In order to gain a better understanding of how to design effective human-
autonomy teams, the present research focused on exploring how characteristics of the 
team’s structure, including each member's role and authority, impacted how workload 
and decision making are shared. The results from this direct comparison of operator-
driven and role-driven team structures help identify the implications of moving from a 
supervisory control approach to a teaming approach. Two team compositions, human-
human and human-autonomy, were also compared in this research to provide data on the 
similarities and differences. This was accomplished by comparing the team processes and 
communications employed as the team members worked together cooperatively to 
complete mission scenarios. The impact of the mission’s complexity was also examined 





implementation of interfaces developed using EID principles (Calhoun et al., 2018; Frost 
et al., 2019) were also evaluated. Several interfaces were considered in terms of their 
ability to support overall teaming as well as specific teaming aspects such as 







Twenty-four volunteers (19 males, 5 females) participated in this study. 
Participants included military and civilians from Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
students from local universities, and individuals recruited via word-of-mouth from the 
general population. Ages ranged from 19 to 36 (M = 26.50, SD = 4.70). All participants 
reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and color vision. Military and government 
civilians received their regular duty pay. All other participants received $30 for their 
participation. 
Apparatus 
This research was conducted at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base using a three-
station setup. The stations included a Test Operator Console (TOC) and two C2 stations 
(one for the participant and one for the teammate). All three were equipped with a Dell 
Precision 7910 Tower, running Microsoft Windows 10, with 64 GB RAM and Intel Xeon 
@2.60 GHz (two processors) and mouse and keyboard controls. Both C2 stations were 
equipped with four Acer T272HUL LED Touchscreen monitors (2560 X 1440), and the 
TOC was equipped with two monitors. The participant station also had a Gamecom CDR 
10112 headset. The TOC and the teammate’s C2 station were set up along a wall adjacent 
to the participant’s C2 station, such that they were not visible to participants when they 






Figure 1. Room and station setup. 
Simulation Testbed. Each station used the Fusion framework (Rowe, Spriggs, 
Boyer, & Hughes, 2018) and was running a simulation referred to as “IMPACT” 
(Intelligent Multi-UxV Planner with Adaptive Collaborative/Control Technologies). The 
control station prototype IMPACT integrated several autonomy advancements to support 
the command and control of multiple heterogeneous (air, ground, and surface (sea)) UVs 
by a human operator during a base defense mission (Figure 2; Draper et al., 2017, 2018). 
Autonomous capabilities in IMPACT included cooperative control algorithms for rapid 
vehicle route planning (UxAS; Rasmussen, Kingston, Humphrey, 2018) and intelligent 
agent reasoning, which compares possible courses of actions and makes vehicle 
allocation recommendation (Hansen, Calhoun, Douglass, & Evans, 2016).  
 





A “play-calling” approach was used that enables a single operator to develop and 
execute a UV plan quickly by calling a high-level play and specifying the location. The 
autonomous capabilities then determined all other parameters (i.e., the vehicle allocation 
and best route) unless the operator defined these as well. This paper describes a few of 
the play-related interfaces, however additional details on the entire suite of interfaces are 
available (Calhoun, Ruff, Behymer, & Mersch, 2017; Calhoun et al., 2018). 
The IMPACT C2 operator stations had four main display areas, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. The top monitor contained a Tactical Situation Display (TSD) that provided a 
map, real-time UV information (locations & routes), and a vehicle summary panel that 
showed the status of current vehicles (e.g., any vehicle warnings/errors). The middle 
bottom monitor provided a ‘sandbox’ display that allowed the operator to investigate 
different what-if scenarios by creating and comparing possible vehicle plans before 
implementing them. The sandbox display contained a map, a chat window, and all play-
based interfaces, including a Play Calling Tile, Task Manager, and an Active Play 
Manager (described in the following sections). The right monitor provided a vehicle 
dashboard for each of the vehicles. Each dashboard included vehicle status information, 
the vehicle’s sensor feed, and functionality to change the active sensor. The final monitor, 
on the left, contained reference materials such as a log of completed tasks, chat windows, 






Figure 3. IMPACT’s display layout. 
 
Play calling and patrol states. Plays were called through the selection of a 
corresponding play icon (Figure 4). The play icon represented both the vehicle type(s) 
that would be assigned and the high-level actions of the vehicle(s). Play icons could be 
selected in several interfaces throughout the control station. The Play Calling Tile 
provided a categorized list of all 25 pre-defined mission-related play icons (Figure 4a; 
Mersch, Behymer, Calhoun, Ruff, & Dewey, 2016). The operator could also call plays 
through a radial menu that was accessed by selecting either a location or a UV on the 
map (Figure 4b). The radial menu contained only the plays directly relevant to that 
selection. Plays were generally called in response to a mission event and pulled one or 








Figure 4. Two of the interfaces for calling plays. 
There were two patrol states. The first, ‘Normal Full Coverage Patrol’ (NFCP), 
occurred when there was not an active threat to or attack on the base. During NFCP, 
vehicles not completing a play were continuously scanning pre-defined Named Areas of 
Interest (NAIs). When an active threat to the base was identified, the operator was tasked 
to change the patrol state to ‘Highly Mobile,’ causing non-tasked vehicles to switch to 
surveilling the base borders. Figure 5 shows the interface that indicated the current patrol 
(icon on the left) and enabled changing the patrol state by selecting the corresponding 
icon on the right-hand side. (This interface was located at the bottom of an Active Play 
Manager, described later.)  
 
 
Figure 5. Background behavior interface. 





Task Manager and Task Log. When a mission event was communicated through 
chat, a task to respond to that event was populated in the Task Manager (Figure 6; for a 
detailed description of the Task Manager interface see Frost et al., 2019). Tasks were 
represented by individual icons and appeared in the main window’s rows (Bartik, Ruff, 
Behymer, Frost, Calhoun, Spriggs, & Hammack, 2017). Placement into the rows was 
based on a pre-assigned priority in relation to the overall base defense mission, with the 
top row containing the highest priority tasks and the bottom row containing the lowest. 
Each task icon was presented within a circle, and the line coding employed for the circle 
was used to designate if the task needed to be completed by the operator at that station 
(solid line) versus their teammate (dotted line). A dashed-dotted line for the circle 
indicated that the task required action from both teammates.  
 
 
Figure 6. Task Manager interface. 
When a task icon was selected in the main window, the icon was highlighted with 
a square outline and shade coding, and two options appeared: an “X” icon to delete the 
task and a “lightning bolt” icon to assign the entire task to the teammate. The pop-up 





task to the teammate. Additionally, the pop-up window provided task details such as the 
exact chat that triggered the creation of the task and a quick reaction checklist (QRC) of 
the steps (or subtasks) that need to be completed. An individual subtask could be handed 
off to the teammate by selecting the lightning bolt icon within the subtask row. If the 
subtask could be completed with a play call, the row included a selectable play icon 
(which enabled play calls directly from the Task Manager). The subtask row was shaded 
when it was either completed by the operator (e.g., a play was called in response) or 
handed off to the teammate (i.e., the lightning bolt icon was selected and filled in). 
Once a task was deleted from the Task Manager, it appeared in a separate log of 
completed tasks. This log provided a record of all the tasks that had been completed as 
well as details about each task such as who completed the task, when the task was 
initially received, and when it was removed from the Task Manager. A task could also be 
sent back to the Task Manager from the log.  
Play Workbook. Selecting a play icon (from any location) resulted in the Play 
Workbook popping up (Figure 7). The right side of the Play Workbook provided an 
editable list of the current constraints being taken into consideration by the agent (e.g., 
environmental conditions, optimizations, and payload requirements). The left side 
provided a summary of the play (i.e., play type and location) and the agent-recommended 
UV(s). The proposed route(s) created by the route planner for the recommended UV(s) 
appeared on the map as a dashed line. Once a proposed plan was accepted, the dashed 
route line on the map turned solid, the UV(s) rerouted to the new path, the workbook 






Figure 7. Play Workbook 
Active Plays. The Active Play Manager (Figure 8a) provided a list of the ongoing 
plays and play details such as the play type (i.e., play icon) and location, which UVs were 
assigned to the play, whether the UVs were ‘in transit’ or ‘on task,’ and how long the 
play had been active. Each play had a unique color that was reflected in the Active Play 
Manager as well as on the UV icon and its route on the map (Figure 8b). If the play was 
called in response to a task, the corresponding task icon was also shown in the play row 
to the left of the play icon. Any plays called by the teammate appeared towards the 
bottom of the Active Play Manager under the label “Teammate Plays.” Plays could be 
canceled by clicking the “X” icon on the far right of each play row.  
       
 
Figure 8. Interfaces for active plays.  






  A 2 (Team Composition) x 2 (Team Structure) x 2 (Mission Complexity) mixed 
design was used (Figure 9). The team’s composition was varied between-subjects, with 
each participant assigned to be part of either a Human-Human (H-H) or Human-
Autonomy (H-A) team. Team Structure and Mission Complexity were varied within-
subjects (Figure 9). Each participant worked with their assigned teammate to complete a 
total of four 30-minute experimental trials. Two trials, a low complexity mission and a 
high complexity mission, were completed with each team structure: Operator-driven and 
Role-driven. Team Structure was counterbalanced to control for learning effects. The low 
complexity trial was always completed first, followed by the high complexity trial, to 
represent an actual base defense operation during which the threat status increases over 
time.  
 Figure 9. Experimental design. 
 
Team Composition. The Human-Human (H-H) team condition consisted of two 
human C2 operators. The participant fulfilled the role of the primary C2 ‘operator’, and a 
confederate fulfilled the role of the human ‘teammate.’ The Human-Autonomy (H-A) 





‘autonomous teammate’ that represented the Autonomy by providing additional agent 
capabilities in the simulation. (Note: the role of the autonomous teammate was also 
fulfilled by a human confederate due to the complexity of the research, but the assistance 
was representative of what autonomy could reasonably accomplish in the near future 
(e.g., they could complete tasks that had defined actions, locations, and times and that did 
not require target identification in a vehicle’s sensor feed to complete). Participants were 
not informed of the human confederate’s role in interactions with the autonomous 
teammate.) The teammates, human and autonomous, differed only in their ability to 
communicate. The human teammate was able to communicate freely through chat, but 
the autonomous teammate’s communication was limited to a small set of messages that 
could be received/sent (see Human-Autonomy handout in Appendix E.). The teammates 
were equal in terms of all other abilities (e.g., which tasks they could and could not 
complete). Unless otherwise specified, both the human teammate and autonomous 
teammate are referred to as the ‘teammate.’ 
Team Structures.  When using the Operator-driven team structure, the operator 
received all taskings and then decided which tasks to complete and which tasks to assign 
to the teammate to complete. The Role-driven team structure had tasks automatically 
assigned based on predefined roles, such that the teammate started completing tasks as 
soon as they were identified without the operator’s assignment. A task was assigned to 
the teammate if it was within the scope of its capabilities and if the task had been 
predetermined to be the responsibility of the teammate. (The specific task details and 
assignments are described later.) The teammate’s capabilities (i.e., which tasks they are 





Mission Complexity. The two levels of Complexity, low vs. high, differed in 
terms of the number of tasks to be completed as well as the interrelatedness and 
simultaneousness of the tasks. The mission details, such as the number and type of 
events, are described later.  
Scenario 
Participants experienced a different mission scenario for each of the four 30-
minute experimental trials. In all scenarios, the team was responsible for the same 
mission area. However, each teammate had control of six different UVs (two air, two 
ground, and two sea surface), which could be tasked in response to mission events. Each 
vehicle had a unique callsign that was comprised of a name based on the vehicle type 
(e.g., all air vehicle callsigns included “falcon” or “FN” for short) and a number. The 
callsigns were used to identify the vehicles across the various interfaces. Participants had 
control of all the vehicles with a callsign ending in an even number (e.g., FN-40) and the 
teammate had control of the vehicles with a callsign ending in an odd number (e.g., FN-
41). Any asset allocation that was performed by the teammate (either through a play call 
or manually) was reflected on the participant’s control station and vice versa.  
The team was responsible for completing primary and secondary mission events. 
All events were relayed via chat messages from a ‘Commander.’ These chat messages 
were preprogrammed and sent from the TOC at set times throughout the mission. The 
experimenter at the TOC station also fulfilled the role of a sensor operator (SO), 
confirming imagery in the vehicle’s sensor feed when requested.  






Random Anti-Terror Measures (RAMs) – Actions that randomized base support 
activities and helped maintain base safety. A list of the RAMs that needed to be 
completed was provided at the start of each mission. Possible RAMs were: 
creating a listening post/observation post, providing a show of force, completing 
an interval (temporal) check, or completing a 360 check (imagery of all sides of 
building/target). All required the operator to call a play in order to have a vehicle 
at a specified location at a specified time. These tasks were of low priority.  
Normal Base Defense Events (NBDEs) – Base defense activities that occurred 
randomly during the mission. These events included: providing an escort or 
overwatch for a friendly force, checking on a building or fence alarm, inspecting 
an unknown or suspicious vehicle, and getting eyes on a requested location. 
NBDEs required the team to call plays, and, for a few tasks, the operator had to 
confirm eyes on (by sending a chat message to the SO confirming that the target 
can be seen in the vehicle’s sensor feed). These tasks were of moderate priority. 
Intruder Events – An unexpected active threat or attack on the base that had been 
identified. Potential Intruder Events were: crowd forming, gate runner, mortar 
fire, perimeter breach, and a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device. Intruder 
Events required the team to discontinue any ongoing RAMs (in order to make 
vehicles available to respond to high priority actions), call plays, and change the 
patrol state from NFCP to Highly Mobile. These tasks were the highest priority.  
Each NBDE and Intruder Event had a corresponding ‘all clear’ message (e.g., the 
suspicious vehicle has been apprehended). When the all clear message was received, the 





Events, the participant was also responsible for changing the patrol state back to NFCP 
and resuming RAMs.  
Secondary mission events. Participants also had to respond to queries from the 
Commander. There were two types of queries: UV related & situation awareness (SA). 
UV related queries involved questions about a vehicle’s status (e.g., a vehicle’s altitude) 
or allocation. SA queries were implemented as a measurement of the operator’s situation 
awareness and requested information about the team’s task completion status or 
assignment (e.g., which tasks are the teammate's current responsibility). See Appendix B 
for a list of possible queries. A query was asked every three minutes, with the query type 
alternating such that UV queries and SA queries were each asked every 6 minutes. Both 
types of queries were answered by sending a response through chat. Query tasks were the 
lowest priority.  
Lastly, participants were prompted every five minutes to rate their current 
workload using the Bedford Workload Scale (Roscoe, 1984; see Appendix D). A 
message stating, “What is your current workload rating?” was received through chat 
(accompanied by a default computer auditory cue), and participants responded through 
chat with their rating. 
Mission complexity.  The mission events and queries just described were used to 
develop two low complexity and two high complexity scenarios. The number of the 
various mission events types (e.g., number of RAMs, vehicle failures, etc.) and the task 
coordination demands (e.g., number of events that can be completed independently vs. 





were counterbalanced across the conditions such that each scenario was used an equal 
number of times with each Team Structure.  
Table 1. Event distribution for low and high complexity missions. 
 
Task creation. Whenever a RAM, NBDE, Intruder Event, or query was 
communicated, a corresponding task in the Task Manager was created. Each primary 
event and query type had a corresponding task icon that appeared in the Task Manager. 
(Participants were provided a document showing all icons and task names that they could 
reference during the trials; see Appendix C.) Icons were placed into the rows based on 
their priority, such that the top row contained all the Intruder Events, and the bottom row 
contained all the queries.  
The tasks were assigned to either the operator, teammate, or both (jointly, such 
that each teammate was responsible for at least one subtask). All tasks were populated in 
each teammate’s Task Manager, regardless of the assignment, allowing the participant to 
be aware of what tasks were assigned to the teammate. The operator had no limitations 
regarding which tasks they could complete and was the only team member who could 
cancel any ongoing plays. The teammate, however, could only complete a subset of tasks 
and subtasks (see Appendix E for detailed description). The tasks the teammate could 
complete were the same for both the human and autonomous teammate.  
Mission 









Low 3 6 2 5 5 6 
High 5 10 3 5 5 6 





Team Structure.  With the Operator-driven team structure, all tasks came in 
initially assigned to the participant who then decided which tasks, if any, to assign to the 
teammate using the Task Manager (see Figure 6). For the Role-driven team structure, 
tasks were preassigned such that any task or subtask the teammate could complete was 
automatically assigned to the teammate, and all other tasks and subtasks were assigned to 
the participant (Table 2).  
For both team structures, participants could change the task assignment using the 
Task Manager (new tasks) or the Active Play Manager (ongoing tasks). The teammates 
utilized chat messages and the Task Manager to send any tasks that could not be 
completed (due to capability or asset availability) to the participant along with an 
explanation in chat, the content of which depended on the Team Composition (e.g., “I am 
not [authorized to (H-H) /capable of (H-A)] completing the [task name] task”).  
Table 2. High-level task assignment for the Role-driven team structure. 
Participant Teammate 
• Subset of NBDEs • Subset of NBDEs 
• RAMs • Intruder Events 
• SA Queries related to task 
status or assignment 
• UV Queries related to vehicle 
status or allocation  
Procedure 
The study took approximately seven hours for each participant to complete. A 
predefined protocol was followed that detailed instructions of the participant’s 
introduction, training, experimental trials, and out brief. Training and two of the 
experimental trial missions were completed in the morning with one team structure, 
followed by the third and fourth experimental trial missions in the afternoon with the 





Upon arrival, participants were given an overview of the study and read an 
informed consent document. They then filled out a background questionnaire asking 
about demographic information (age and gender), vision, and hearing.  
Training. The training lasted approximately three and a half hours. Participants 
were first introduced to the IMPACT control station, given an overview of the base 
defense mission, an explanation of their role as a C2 operator, and familiarized with the 
various UVs and the representation of the base (e.g., vehicle icons, base borders, areas of 
interest, etc.). A detailed overview of all four monitors, vehicle status displays (e.g., the 
vehicle dashboards), and how to use the chat system was then provided.  
Next, participants were introduced to the concept of play-calling. After being 
shown how to complete a play call, they were asked to complete a series of different play 
calls (using the Play Calling Tile and the radial menu) at various locations and with 
adjusted constraints. Once they were able to complete all the requested play calls 
accurately, the Task Manager was described. This involved presenting the participants 
one task at a time (including queries) to provide the opportunity for training on how to 
complete all the steps for each task, as well as how to call plays through the Task 
Manager. This practice continued until participants had completed every possible task 
and correctly answered all queries. 
After participants were thoroughly trained on the IMPACT system, they were 
then trained on how to work with their teammate. First, they were given an overview of 
any new interface features and interactions, including how to identify which vehicles the 
controlled versus their teammate, which chat room to use to communicate with the 





indications of their teammate’s/shared tasks in the Task Manager (including how to 
assign tasks to the teammate). The training was focused on the participant's first assigned 
team structure. If the Operator-driven team structure was first, then all the tasks appeared 
in the Task Manager initially assigned to the participant. On the other hand, if the 
participant was assigned to complete the Role-driven team structure first, they saw the 
tasks appear in the Task Manager already assigned to them, their teammate, or both.  
They were next trained on which tasks their teammate could and could not 
complete. If the teammate was another human, participants were informed their teammate 
was ‘authorized’ to complete only particular tasks. Specifically, they were not authorized 
to call plays if there were any subjective aspects (i.e., if the start time or location was not 
specified) or if the task required communication with other people, such as confirming 
eyes on with the sensor operator. When paired with the autonomous teammate, 
participants were told it was ‘capable’ of only completing a subset of tasks. Specifically, 
it could only complete tasks if there was no missing information (e.g., it had a defined 
start time or location), and did not require communication with the commander or sensor 
operator. When using the Role-driven team structure, participants were trained that a task 
would only be assigned to the teammate if it was within the scope of its 
capabilities/authorization and if that task had been predetermined to be the responsibility 
of that teammate. A help document was displayed on IMPACT’s left side monitor at all 
times that summarized this task division (see Appendix E). 
Lastly, a final capstone scenario was completed. Before starting the scenario, 
participants were introduced to the Bedford Workload Scale and given an overview of 





at any time (see Appendix D). During the capstone scenario, participants encountered all 
possible tasks (including queries every 3 minutes) and rated their workload. Primary 
events were communicated one at a time, and the scenario did not progress until the 
participant demonstrated that they could complete the current task. An experimenter was 
available to answer questions and interject when errors were made. The capstone took 30-
45 minutes to complete.  
Experimental Trials. For the first trial, participants completed a 30-minute low 
complexity mission where they were responsible for working with either a human or 
autonomous teammate to complete the base defense mission described earlier. This was 
followed by a post-mission questionnaire (see Appendix F). Participants then completed a 
high complexity 30-minute mission using the same Team Structure, followed by the same 
post-mission questionnaire. There was then an hour break for lunch. After the break, 
participants were trained on the other Team Structure, completed a shortened capstone 
scenario, and then two more 30-minute missions using that Team Structure (the low 
complexity and then the high complexity mission), each followed by the post-mission 
questionnaire.  
A final questionnaire was given at the completion of all experimental trials (see 
Appendix G). Lastly, they were debriefed, which included asking follow-up questions 
about the system, their teammate, and any additional feedback they may have had (see 
Appendix H). Participants that were part of the Human-Autonomy condition were also 
asked at the conclusion of the study if they were aware that the teammate’s role was 





some suspicions; however, none were positive, and all indicated that it did not influence 
their actions or questionnaire feedback. 
Objective Measures  
All actions performed by both teammates (e.g., plays called, tasks handed off, 
etc.) and communications were logged, and video of the participant’s sandbox display 
was recorded for all trials. Data provided by the logs and video were used for objective 
measures of the team’s performance, team processes, and situation awareness.  
Team performance. Team performance used objective measures of task 
completion (number of tasks completed), task accuracy (correctness of tasks), task 
proficiency (time to complete tasks), and overall mission performance. Scoring for each 
was completed, as described below.  
Task completion. In order to account for differences in the number of tasks for 
low and high complexity missions, a percentage of task completed was calculated by 
taking the total number of tasks the team completed per mission divided by the total 
number of tasks for that mission. A task was considered ‘completed’ if every subtask was 
accomplished (regardless of accuracy).  
Task accuracy. Task accuracy was calculated by dividing the number of tasks 
completed accurately by the number of tasks completed. A task was considered 
completed accurately if all the task constraints were met. Depending on the task, the 
constraints could include calling and canceling plays at the correct time (within 2 minutes 
of receiving the task/all-clear message), calling the correct play at the correct location, 
confirming eyes on with the SO, and, for intruder events, changing the patrol state and 





off to the teammate when the teammate could not complete the task, due to either 
capability/authority or asset availability.  
Task proficiency. Task proficiency was based on the team’s total response time 
for each mission (which was measured as the sum of all the individual task response 
times). A ‘task response time’ was measured based on the sum of response times from the 
time a task was received until the play was called in response and the time from when the 
‘all clear’ was received until the play was canceled. (For tasks that required multiple play 
calls, the sum of the response times was taken.) Three minutes (180 s) was determined as 
the upper time limit, similar to the method used to enforce a maximum response time in 
an earlier study utilizing IMPACT by Draper et al. (2018). Any missing response times or 
times greater than that limit were replaced with 180 seconds. The analysis revealed that 
this resulted in no ceiling effect or skewed data. Response times were not calculated for 
RAMs, overwatches, and escorts since those tasks only required a UV to be at a location 
at a specified time and therefore did not require immediate action after receiving the task 
to be accurately completed. 
Mission performance. For each individual task, a ‘task score’ was determined by 
the total number of points earned for that task. Up to one point could be received (if 
applicable) for each of the following: correct play(s) called, calling play(s) at the correct 
location, meeting time constraint(s), confirming eyes on with the SO, canceling play(s), 
and changing the patrol state. A ‘task type score’ was then calculated by taking the sum 
of points for all tasks of the same type, resulting in three task scores (one each for RAMs, 
NBDEs, and Intruder Events). The team’s mission performance score was then calculated 





scored equaled (RAM task score + 2*NBDE task score + 3*Intruder Events task score) / 
total possible points 
Team processes. Team processes were measured by tasks assignment (who was 
responsible for completing each task) and the communications between the teammates. 
Task assignment was calculated as the percentage of subtasks each mission that was the 
responsibility of the participant vs. the teammate. For communication, the number of 
chats sent by the team was totaled for each mission. The number of tasks the participant 
assigned to the teammate was also analyzed.  
Subjective Measures  
Participants rated their workload six times (every five minutes) during each mission 
using the method described earlier. A single workload rating was calculated for each 
mission by taking the mean of the ratings throughout the mission. After each mission, 
participants used 7-point Likert scales to rate their perceived mission difficulty (Easy to 
Hard), self and team performance (Low to High), situation awareness (Never Aware to 
Always Aware), trust (Low to High), and statements about various teaming components 
(Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). A list of teaming components and the number of 
statements for each component are listed in Table 3. Several of these items were modified 
from the Team Affect Questionnaire employed by Wailliser, Mead, & Shaw (2017) and 
the role clarity questions from Hassan (2013). Most statements were written such that 
agreement meant indicated a greater presence of the component. Any statements that 












Team perception The participant perceived themselves as part of a team. 4 
Reliability The teammate was reliable. 1 
Team cognition Actions are in line with expectations, and teammates are on the “same page.” 5 
Communication 
and coordination Able to effectively communicate and coordinate efforts. 5 
Role clarity Each teammate knows what they were supposed to do, their responsibility, and the priority of their tasks. 6 
 
For the final questionnaire (see Appendix G), participants compared both Team 
Structures in terms of perceived mission difficulty, performance (self and team), and 
situation awareness using a 7-point Likert scale (ranging for Operator-driven Better to 
Role-driven Better). They also provided an overall rating for the Task Manager and 
Active Play Manager based on how much it affected their ability to work effectively with 
the teammate to complete the mission (i.e., how well it supported teaming between them 
and their teammate) using a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from Greatly Hindered to 
Greatly Aided). Statements regarding specific Task Manager features (e.g., the task icons 
were intuitive/easy to decipher) were rated using a 5-point Likert scale (ranging from 
Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). Lastly, participants completed the System 
Usability Scale (SUS; Brooke, 1996), which uses a 5-point Likert scale, and provided 







In this section, results pertaining to both the objective and subjective data are 
described for each of the three independent variables in turn: Team Composition, Team 
Structure, and Mission Complexity. Lastly, results pertaining to the interfaces and overall 
system usability are presented. One exception is that the performance results pertaining to 
UV queries are not reported for any of the independent variables as participants’ data on 
this team performance measure were close to perfect (completing 99.58% (SD = 2.87%) 
of the queries with a mean accuracy of 99.38% (SD = 3.50%)).  
A 2 (Team Composition; between-subjects) x 2 (Team Structure; within-subjects) 
x 2 (Mission Complexity; within-subjects) mixed-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
was conducted for most measures. Contrasts were conducted to analyze significant 
interactions. Outliers were determined using exploratory data analysis, as described by 
Tukey (1977). All trial data points 1.5 times the interquartile range below the first 
quartile as well as 1.5 times the interquartile range above the third quartile (approximate 
median ± 2.698 standard deviations) were replaced with the grand mean.  
There were a total of 96 data points for each measure (four data points per 
participant, one for each experimental trial). Out of the 1,152 data points across all team 
performance and team process measures, workload ratings, and SA query responses, 





collected during the four experimental trials and the number of outliers for each measure 
are shown in Figure 10 
 
Figure 10. Results Summary 
Team Composition 
This section describes the Human-Human and the Human-Autonomy Team 
Composition results for team performance, workload, and situation awareness, followed 
by team processes and questionnaire ratings. There were no significant interactions with 
Team Structure or Mission Complexity for any of the dependent variables. The 
performance of the teammate, when fulfilling the role of a human compared to the role of 
autonomy, did not significantly differ in terms of the percentage of tasks completed (p = 
.99) or the accuracy of the tasks completed (p = .49). 































 F(1,22) = 6.33 
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Total 2 F(1,22) = 5.47 p < .03 
 F(1,22) = 140.94 
p < .001 
    
Sent by the 
participant 4 
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Team performance, workload, and situation awareness. There were no 
significant differences as a function of whether Team Composition was Human-Human 
or Human-Autonomy for any of the four measures for Team Performance (task 
completion, task accuracy, task proficiency, and mission performance), or in terms of 
workload ratings and SA query accuracy (Table 4).  
Table 4. Means and standard deviations for all measures by Team Composition. 
Team processes. The main effect of Team Composition was not significant for 
the percentage of subtasks completed by the participant, F(1, 22) = 0.31, p = .59, ηp2 = 
.01, completed by the teammate, F(1, 22) = 0.03, p = .87, ηp2 = .00, or the percentage not 
completed, F(1, 22) = 0.20, p = .66, ηp2 = .01. With the Operator-driven team structure, 
participants assigned the same number of subtasks to their teammate, regardless of 
whether the teammate was human (M = 9.58, SD = 1.00) or autonomous (M = 9.56, SD = 
1.29). Role-driven was not considered for task assignment since tasks were preassigned 
and the participants rarely took the tasks away from the teammate.  
The main effect of Team Composition was significant for the total number of 
chats exchanged, F(1, 22) = 5.47, p < .03, ηp2 = .20. The team exchanged significantly 
more chats when the composition was Human-Human compared to Human-Autonomy 
Measure 
Team Composition 
Human-Human  Human-Autonomy 
M SD   M SD 
Task completion (%) 86.99% 4.69%  85.51% 5.35% 
Task accuracy (%) 61.87% 11.40%  59.14% 8.59% 
Task proficiency (s) 95.90 28.99  102.63 28.65 
Mission performance (%) 86.21% 3.89%  84.50% 4.10% 
Workload rating (1-10) 3.65 0.91   3.38 1.10 
SA query accuracy (%) 73.31% 12.31%  77.81% 9.48% 





(Figure 11). The main effect of Team Composition was not significant when considering 
only the number of chats sent by the participant (F(1, 22) = 0.27, p = .61, ηp2 = .01) or 
only the number of chats sent by the teammate (F(1, 22) = 0.15, p = .71, ηp2 = .01).  
 
Figure 11. Mean number of chats sent by Team Composition. 
Questionnaire ratings. Perceived mission difficulty, performance (self and 
team), and situation awareness were not rated significantly different. The main effect of 
Team Composition was significant for the ratings on trust, F(1, 22) = 9.78, p < .01, ηp2 = 
.31, and teammate reliability, F(1, 22) = 6.75, p < .02, ηp2 = .24. Participants rated trust in 
their teammate significantly higher for all missions when they were part of the Human-
Human Team Composition (M = 6.37, SD = 0.89) compared to the Human-Autonomy 
composition (M = 5.47, SD = 1.40; Figure 12). Participants also rated their teammates’ 
reliability significantly higher when assigned to a human teammate (M = 6.63, SD = 0.55) 
compared to participants who worked with an autonomous teammate (M = 6.03, SD = 
0.57; Figure 12).  






Figure 12. Mean trust and reliability ratings by Team Composition. 
There were no other significant differences for the post-mission questionnaire 
items. Table 5 shows the mean and standard deviations of the various teaming component 
ratings for each team composition.  




Human-Human  Human-Autonomy 
M SD  M SD 
Team perception 4.38 0.50  4.55 0.63 
Reliability* 6.63 0.67  6.03 0.86 
Communication and coordination 5.75 1.25  5.60 1.17 
Team cognition 6.03 0.99  5.73 1.06 
Role clarity 6.31 0.67  6.26 0.75 
*p < .05 when comparing Operator-Driven and Role-driven means. 
Team Structure  
This section describes the Operator-driven and Role-driven Team Structure 
results, including any significant interactions with Mission Complexity (and the main 
effect of Mission Complexity when applicable). There were no significant interactions 







Team performance.  
Task completion. The main effects of Team Structure, F(1, 22) = 6.33, p < .02, 
ηp2 = .22, and Mission Complexity F(1, 22) = 237.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .92, were 
significant, as was the interaction between Team Structure and Mission Complexity, F(1, 
22) = 7.69, p < .02, ηp2 = .26. This interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 11. The 
comparison for Team Structure at low Mission Complexity was not significant, F(1, 23) 
= 0.70, p = .41, ηp2 = .03. The comparison for Team Structure at high Mission 
Complexity was significant, F(1, 22) = 8.00, p < .01, ηp2 = .27, such that teams completed 
a significantly lower percentage of tasks with the Operator-driven structure (M = 72.45%, 
SD = 12.63%) than with the Role-driven structure (M = 80.99%, SD = 6.24%). The 
comparisons of the low and high Mission Complexity were significant for both the 
Operator-driven (F(1, 22) = 134.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .86) and the Role-driven (F(1, 22) = 
84.76, p < .01, ηp2 = .79) structures, indicating a significantly lower percentage of tasks 








Figure 13. Mean percentage of tasks completed by Team Structure and Mission 
Complexity. Error bars are Standard Errors of the Means in this and all figures. 
Task accuracy. The main effect of Team Structure was significant, F(1, 22) = 
6.09, p < .03, ηp2 = .22. A significantly lower mean percentage of tasks were completed 
accurately with the Operator-driven structure (M = 57.74%, SD = 12.69%) than the Role-
driven structure (M = 63.27%, SD = 10.64%; Figure 14). There was no significant 
interaction with Mission Complexity, F(1, 22) = 0.31, p = .59, ηp2 = .01. 
 





Task proficiency. The main effects of Team Structure, F(1, 22) = 18.44, p < .001, 
ηp2 = .46, and of Mission Complexity, F(1, 22) = 68.61, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, were 
significant, as was the interaction between Team Structure and Mission Complexity, F(1, 
22) = 9.42, p < .01, ηp2 = .30. This interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 15. The 
comparison for Team Structure at low Mission Complexity was significant, F(1, 22) = 
7.07, p < .02, ηp2 = .24, with the participants taking 39.49% longer to complete tasks with 
the Operator-driven structure (M = 87.69, SD = 39.13), than with the Role-driven (M = 
62.87, SD = 22.78), indicating that participants had greater task proficiency with the 
Role-driven structure. The comparison for Team Structure at high Mission Complexity 
was also significant, F(1, 22) = 22.13, p < .001, ηp2 = .50. The difference increased to 
53.74% longer with the Operator-driven (M = 160.28, SD = 66.69) than the Role-driven 
structure (M = 104.25, SD = 35.17). The differences between the low and high 
complexity missions were significant for both the Operator-driven (F(1, 22) = 56.53, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .72) and the Role-driven (F(1, 22) = 32.47, p < .001, ηp2 = .60) structures, 









Mission performance. The main effects of Team Structure, F(1, 22) = 7.41, p < 
.02, ηp2 = .25, and Mission Complexity, F(1, 22) = 216.37 p < .001, ηp2 = .91, were 
significant, as was the interaction between Team Structure and Mission Complexity, F(1, 
22) = 13.03, p < .01, ηp2 = .37. This interaction effect is illustrated in Figure 16. The 
comparison for Team Structure at low Mission Complexity was not significant, F(1, 22) 
= 0.35, p = .56, ηp2 = .02. The comparison for Team Structure at high Mission 
Complexity was significant, F(1, 22) = 11.06, p < .01, ηp2 = .33, with teams receiving a 
significantly lower overall mean mission performance score with the Operator-driven 
structure (M = 78.44%, SD = 7.56%) than the Role-driven (M = 83.12%, SD = 4.03%). 
The differences between the low and high complexity missions were significant for both 
the Operator-driven (F(1, 22) = 112.43, p < .001, ηp2 = .84) and the Role-driven (F(1, 22) 
= 143.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .87) structures, indicating a significantly lower mission 
performance score in the high complexity missions. 
 
Figure 16. Mean performance score by Team Structure and Mission Complexity. 
 
Workload. The main effect of Team Structure was significant, F(1, 22) = 7.96, p 





workload as significantly higher when using the Operator-driven team structure (M = 
3.83, SD = 1.05) compared to the Role-driven team structure (M = 3.20, SD = 1.27). 
 
Figure 17. Mean workload ratings by Team Structure. 
Situation awareness. Situation awareness was objectively measured by the 
accuracy of responses to the SA queries. Percent correct was calculated by dividing the 
number of correct responses by the total number of responses for each mission. The main 
effect of Team Structure was not significant for the percentage of correct SA query 
responses, F(1, 22) = 0.99, p = .33, ηp2 = .04.  
There were also no statistically significant differences in perceived SA on the 
post-mission questionnaires. Responses on the final questionnaire were split such that 10 
participants rated their perceived situation awareness better with the Operator-driven 
team structure, 10 rated it better with the Role-driven team structure, and 4 were neutral. 
Team processes. The main effects of Team Structure were significant for the 
mean percentage of subtasks completed by the participants, F(1, 22) = 5.43, p < .02, ηp2 = 
.20 and the teammates, F(1, 22) = 19.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .48 (Figure 17). Participants 
completed a higher percentage of subtasks (excluding all queries) with the Operator-





4.25%). On the other hand, when the operator was responsible for task assignment 
(Operator-driven), the teammate completed significantly fewer subtasks (M = 40.40%, 
SD = 6.85%) than when they were automatically assigned (Role-driven; M = 46.04%, SD 
= 1.41%). 
 
Figure 18. Percentage of subtasks completed by each team member by Team Structure.  
In regard to the percentage of subtasks not completed, the main effects of Team 
Structure, F(1, 22) = 6.16, p < .01, ηp2 = .22, and Mission Complexity F(1, 22) = 110.22, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .83 were significant, as well as the interaction between Team Structure 
and Mission Complexity, F(1, 22) = 9.20, p < .01, ηp2 = .30. This interaction is illustrated 
in Figure 18. The comparison for Team Structure at low Mission Complexity was not 
significant, F(1, 22) = 0.27, p = .61, ηp2 = .01. However, the comparison for Team 
Structure at high Mission Complexity was significant, F(1, 22) = 10.98, p < .01, ηp2 = .33. 
A significantly higher percentage of subtasks were not completed with the Operator-
driven team structure (M = 16.19%, SD = 8.02%) than the Role-driven (M = 10.87%, SD 
= 4.36%), F(1, 22) = 10.98, p < .01, ηp2 = .33. The comparisons of the low and high 
Mission Complexity were significant for both the Operator-driven (F(1, 22) = 85.33, p < 





that there was a significantly higher percentage of subtasks not completed in the high 
complexity missions.  
 
Figure 19. Mean percentage of subtasks not completed by Team Structure and Mission 
Complexity. 
The main effect of Team Structure for communications was not significant, F(1, 
22) = 0.00, p = 1.00, ηp2 = .00. The number of chat communications did not differ 
significantly, with the team exchanging approximately the same number of chats on 
average with the Operator-driven (M = 3.96, SD = 2.07) and the Role-driven (M = 3.98, 
SD = 1.04). There were also no significant differences in the number of chats sent by only 
the participant, F(1, 22) = 0.00, p = .98, ηp2 = .00, or the teammate, F(1, 22) = 0.03, p = 
.87, ηp2 = .00.  
Questionnaire ratings.  Perceived performance (self and team) and situation 
awareness ratings were not significantly different. However, the main effect of Team 
Structure for perceived mission difficulty, F(1, 22) = 14.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .40, was 
significant (Figure 20). Participants rated mission difficulty significantly higher when 
using the Operator-driven structure (M = 4.27, SD = 0.91) than the Role-driven (M = 





   
Figure 20. Mean ratings of mission difficulty by Team Structure. 
For the team perception ratings (i.e., how much participants perceived themselves 
as part of a team), there were no significant main effects but there was a significant 
interaction between Team Structure and Mission Complexity, F(1, 22) = 8.12, p < .01, 
ηp2 = .27. This interaction is illustrated in Figure 21. The comparison for Team Structure 
at low Mission Complexity was significant, F(1, 22) = 5.26, p < .03, ηp2 = .20. Team 
perception was rated significantly higher for the Operator-driven (M = 4.66, SD = 0.52) 
structure compared to the Role-driven (M = 4.33, SD = 0.62) after low complexity 
missions. However, the comparison for Team Structure at high Mission Complexity was 
not significant, F(1, 22) = 0.67, p = .42, ηp2 = .03 The comparison of the low and high 
Mission Complexity was significant for the Operator-driven structure, F(1, 22) = 5.18, p 
< .04, ηp2 = .19, but was not significant for the Role-driven, F(1, 22) = 2.35, p = .14, ηp2 = 
.10. This indicates that as complexity increased, team perceptions decreased for the 







Figure 21. Mean ratings of team perception by Team Structure and Mission Complexity. 
There were no other significant differences in the ratings for the other post-
mission questionnaire items. Table 6 shows the mean and standard deviations of the 
various teaming components for each team structure.  




Operator-driven  Role-driven 
M SD  M SD 
Team perception 4.53 0.50  4.40 0.53 
Reliability 6.22 0.87  6.45 0.57 
Communication and coordination 5.74 1.00  5.61 0.89 
Team cognition 5.81 1.07  5.95 0.87 
Role clarity 6.15 0.79  6.42 0.52 
Note: None of the mean differences are statistically significant.  
Mission Complexity 
The ANOVA results described earlier revealed several main effects and 
interactions of Mission Complexity and Team Structure. This section covers the 





Team Performance and workload. The main effects of Mission Complexity for 
task accuracy, F(1, 22) = 16.04, p < .001, ηp2 = .42 (Figure 22), and workload, F(1, 22) = 
66.77, p < .01, ηp2 = .75 (Figure 23), were significant. Task were completed less 
accurately and workload was rated significantly greater for the high complexity missions 
compared to low complexity missions.  
 
Figure 22. Mean percentage of tasks completed accurately by Mission Complexity. 
 
Figure 23. Mean workload ratings by Mission Complexity. 
Team Processes. The main effect of Mission Complexity was not significant for 
the percentage of subtasks completed by the participant, F(1, 22) = 2.72, p = .12, ηp2 = 
.11. However, the main effect of Mission Complexity was significant for the percentage 





24). The teammate completed a significantly lower percentage of tasks during the high 
complexity missions (M = 39.47%, SD = 3.59%) than the low complexity missions (M = 
47.38%, SD = 3.13%).  
 
Figure 24. Percentage of subtasks completed by each team member by Mission 
Complexity. 
For communications, the main effect of Mission Complexity was significant, F(1, 
22) = 140.94, p < .001, ηp2 = .87. A significantly higher number of chats were sent during 
the high complexity missions compared to the low complexity (Figure 25). The main 
effect of Mission Complexity was also significant for number of chats sent by the 
participant, F(1, 22) = 70.87, p < .001, ηp2 = .76, and number of chats sent by the 
teammate, F(1, 22) = 155.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .88. Both the participant and teammate sent 
significantly more chats during high complexity missions (Figure 25). 
 





Interface Feedback and System Usability 
Task Manager. Participants provided an overall rating for the Task Manager (see 
Figure 6) based on how much it affected their ability to work effectively with the 
teammate to complete the mission (i.e., how well it supported teaming between them and 
their teammate) using a 7-point Likert scale (ranging from Greatly Hindered to Greatly 
Aided). The distribution of ratings is shown in Figure 26. The Task Manager was rated 
by 23 of the 24 participants that it aided the ability to work with the teammate. The 
remaining participant rated it one point below neutral and stated that although the 
interface design was impressive, tasks that had a delayed start time disrupted the flow of 
task completion (e.g., tasks that did not start immediately after they were received such as 
RAMs).  
 
Figure 26. Distribution of ratings pertaining to the Task Manager’s support of teaming. 
Specific features of the Task Manager were also rated using a 5-point Likert scale 
(ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree). Regardless of the teammate, 





4.38, SD = 0.49), icons were intuitive (M = 4.04, SD = 0.81), tasks were appropriately 
prioritized (M = 4.46, SD = 0.66), incoming task were easy to manage (M = 4.25, SD = 
0.90), task assignments were clear (M = 4.38, SD = 1.13), and it was clear which steps 
they needed to take (M = 4.42, SD = 0.65). 
Active Play Manager. Participants also rated the Active Play Manager (Figure 8) 
in terms of how well it supported teaming between them and their teammate (ranging 
from Greatly Hindered to Greatly Aided). A total of 21 of the 24 participants rated that it 
aided the ability to work with the teammate. The distribution of ratings is shown in 
Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. Distribution of ratings pertaining to the Active Play Manager’s support of 
teaming. 
System Usability Scale. The overall usability of the control station simulation 
was assessed using the System Usability Scale. The SUS asks participants to evaluate 10 
items related to system usability using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree 
to Strongly Disagree, with these 10 items contributing to an overall SUS score. The mean 





Figure 28 (note that odd-numbered questions are positive statements and even-
numbered questions are negative statements; therefore, high scores are better for the odd-
numbered questions and low scores better for the even-numbered questions). The overall 
score mean was 71.36 (SD = 10.63), which is considered “above average” based on the 
mean SUS score of 68 (Sauro, 2011).  
 






The main goal of this research was to investigate the implications of team 
structure moving from a supervisory control approach (Operator-driven) to a human-
autonomy teaming configuration (Role-driven). The results of this study indicated several 
key performance and workload differences between the two structures. A summary of 
which hypotheses were and were not supported is shown in Table 7. Additionally, this 
research gathered valuable feedback regarding the implementation of interfaces designed 
to support teaming, especially a task management interface. The results also provided a 
few insights into the differences between human-autonomy teams and human-human 
teams.  
Table 7. Hypotheses summary 
 Operator-driven Role-driven 
 
H1 Fewer tasks completed More tasks completed  Supported 
H2 Tasks completed slower Tasks completed faster Supported 
H3 Tasks completed more accurately Tasks completed less accurately Not Supported 
H4 Increased operator workload Decreased operator workload Supported 
H5 Increased situation awareness Loss of situation awareness  Not Supported 
Team Structure 
Team Performance.  As hypothesized, the Role-driven structure resulted in a 
higher percentage of tasks being completed and tasks being completed faster. This 
perhaps reflects the fact that participants in this teaming structure did not have the 
additional workload and decision-making cognitive load involved in the Operator-driven 





teammate. The task-assignment responsibility may have created a bottleneck that in turn 
negatively impacted team performance measures in the Operator-driven structure. Similar 
benefits are seen with non-hierarchical organizations that do not require taskings to go 
through a central point and therefore enable rapid responses (e.g., Bowers, Urban & 
Morgan, 1992).  
In contrast, it was expected that participants being more involved in task 
assignment (Operator-driven structure) would lead to better oversight, improving task 
accuracy. However, task accuracy was better with the Role-driven structure compared to 
Operator-driven. This may reflect participants’ ability in the Role-driven structure to 
commit more time and attentional resources to their own tasks, not being distracted by 
also having to assign tasks (as was the case in the Operator-driven structure). 
One potential contributing factor to team performance measures being worse with 
the Operator-driven structure compared to the Role-driven is how the respective 
teammates were utilized. In the Role-driven team structure, the teammates were 
automatically assigned all of the tasks that could be completed by them, thus promoting 
maximum utilization of the teammate. In contrast, the number of tasks completed by the 
teammate in the Operator-driven structure was driven by the frequency at which the 
participants assigned tasks. The results showed that teammates completed significantly 
fewer tasks during missions with the Operator-driven structure compared to the Role-
driven structure, providing evidence that they were underutilized. Further research is 
needed to explore how to support more effective task sharing. For example, perhaps the 
interfaces should provide a better indication of the teammate’s capacity for additional 





Workload. Hypothesis 4, that an operator-driven structure would result in an 
increased workload compared to a role-driven team structure, was supported. These 
findings are similar to previously reported results examining workload differences between 
management-by-consent and management-by-exception automation control schemes (Ruff, 
Narayanan, & Draper, 2002). The Operator-driven team structure used in the present 
experiment is similar to a management-by-consent scheme (operator required to make a 
consent response before autonomy can complete an action) in that both require the operator 
to engage in additional decision making and associated control station inputs for task 
completion. Both the management-by-consent scheme and the Operator-driven team 
structure resulted in the operator completing more tasks and higher workload ratings. In 
contrast, the operator has fewer steps to complete and lower workload with a management-
by-exception scheme and the Role-driven team structure. With a role-driven structure, the 
initial task assignment is automated, and in management-by-exception schemes, specific 
actions are automatically completed unless the operator decides to intervene. The 
similarities in workload ratings between the Role-driven team structure and management-
by-exception, as well as the task completion similarities between the Operator-driven 
structure and management-by-consent scheme, are noteworthy since participants in the 
present experiment only had to make high-level task assignments, and the autonomy 
determined how to complete the tasks.  
It is also important to note that even though there was an increase in workload with 
the Operator-driven team structure, the mean workload ratings for both structures remained 
at a satisfactory level based on the Bedford Workload Scale rating description, with 





Situation Awareness. Results from both objective and subjective measures failed 
to support hypothesis 5, that an operator-driven team structure would result in greater 
situation awareness. Feedback from the participants indicated that the Operator-driven 
team structure “…forced [the operator] to pay closer attention to the tasks…” 
(Participant 4). Whereas, feedback about the Role-driven team structure, indicated that it 
was easier “…focusing on the big-picture rather than narrowing in on specific bits of 
tasks” (Participant 8). This feedback is aligned with the results on the final questionnaire, 
where the subjects were split evenly on which team structure they perceived to provide 
better situation awareness. The Operator-driven team structure forced attentional 
resources to be spent on task-specific details in order to appropriately manage task 
assignments. However, the Role-driven team structure removed the need for management 
of task assignments and freed-up attentional resources and allowed the participants to 
gain a better understanding of the overall mission state. 
The objective situation awareness questions, that were asked throughout each 
mission, focused more on task-specific awareness, which may explain the slightly higher 
percentage of correct responses with the Operator-driven team structure (although this 
difference was not statically significant). These questions, which measured the perception 
of lower-level data about tasks, correspond with Level 1 of Endsley’s (1995) three levels 
of situation awareness. Future research should explore diversifying the measures of 
situation awareness to encompass all three levels, including a variety of questions about 
tasks, higher-level mission status and implications, and future projections. These findings 
and participant feedback also stress the importance of interface design to support 





Mission Complexity. The potential influences mission complexity can have on 
the team’s performance, and their interactions, are reflected throughout the results. 
Increased complexity led to decreases in performance and increases in response times, 
workload, and communications. Also, the higher mission complexity revealed differences 
in the percentage of tasks completed and overall mission performance scores that did not 
occur in the low complexity missions. The finding that some differences were present in 
high complexity situations but not in low provides support for the notion that approaches 
for human-autonomy teaming should be examined under a variety of mission states with 
varying demands.  
In this study, as complexity increased, the benefits of a role-driven team structure 
over those of the operator-driven remained consistent. Even so, the Role-driven team 
structure had significant declines in team performance. Jobidon et al. (2006) had similar 
results, which showed that their functional team, where team members had individual 
roles, had relatively better performance compared to a territory-specific division. 
However, as the workload increased, the functional team's performance significantly 
declined over time, whereas the territory-specific division did not have performance 
declines associated with workload increases. These earlier results indicate that a variety 
of alternative human-autonomy teaming strategies should be evaluated to identify one or 
more team structures that can flexibly manage shifting mission demands. 
However, the ‘best’ team structure may not always be straight forward. As La 
Porte & Consolini (1998) reported, when the task changes, the ideal structure could 
switch based on changing demands. Future research should aim to identify varying 





situational triggers or task changes that may necessitate a switch from one structure to 
another. Additionally, in order to support the potential need for shifting structures, 
dynamic working agreements, and adaptive workload tasking should be explored to 
address their utility in complex, dynamic work environments.  
Alternative team structures. The team structures explored in this study were 
chosen to represent current supervisory control approaches and future teaming initiatives. 
However, alternative teaming strategies should be explored. Participants were asked to 
provide feedback about how they would divide tasks if their teammate had equal abilities 
(i.e., they could complete all the same tasks). Suggestions included regional division, 
alternating assignment (i.e., every other one), assignment of only complete tasks (such 
that there are no shared tasks), and division based on the teammate’s expertise or 
resource availability. Several of these task divisions have been looked at previously in the 
human-human research (e.g., Hollenbeck, 2000; Jobion et al., 2006; MacMillan, Entin & 
Serfaty, 2004) but have not been explored with human-autonomy teams. Prospective 
research focused on the wide range of potential team structures should aim to identify the 
unique tradeoffs and benefits of the various approaches. 
Interface Design to Support Communication, Coordination, and Team Cognition 
Communication. Communications via chat were fairly infrequent overall, 
regardless of the team’s composition or structure; on average, less than five chat 
messages were sent per each 30-minute mission. These results may reflect the features of 
the training, design of the control station, and participants’ tasks. Participants were 
trained on teammate capabilities and tasks that could be handled by the teammate prior to 





information. Also, the symbology used on the displays was designed to facilitate quick 
retrieval of status information (e.g., available assets and task assignment), and the Task 
Manager interface facilitated efficient task assignment. Thus, control station design may 
have made it more likely that needed information could be efficiently acquired from the 
displays rather than taking the time to employ the chat system. 
Table 8 contains several of the participants' comments regarding the means of 
communication. On the final questionnaire and during the debrief conversation, 
participants' comments support the notion that the interface’s functionality and 
representations enabled them to conduct most of the desired interactions with their 
teammate and obtain needed information. Specifically, Participant 15 mentions the 
possibility of the interface providing most of the necessary information that they received 
through chat. Using the chat system was viewed as time-consuming in comparison. 
Similar comments were received regardless of the team’s composition but were 
particularly noted by participants working with an autonomous teammate, such as 
Participant 14.  
Table 8. Comments regarding chat communications. 
Participant Comment 
4 “It was helpful to communicate in order to have a shared sense of situation awareness.” 
9 “…the use of type extended the time and efforts of the [mission] objectives.” 
14 “Having to type out a command exactly was cumbersome.” 
15 “We didn’t really utilize chat. It seemed like a warning system could provide the same information.” 
19 “Using the chat system helped me know what was going on at all times.” 
 
While effective communication is an essential aspect of teams, this does not mean 





necessary information. The interface can provide alternate means of communicating the 
information (e.g., pictorially), and there are times where it may even be a preferable way 
of doing so. MacMillian, Entin, and Serfaty (2004) discuss the overhead cost of 
communication and state that since verbal communication requires cognitive resources 
and time, then the team’s performance may be enhanced if communications can be 
reduced or made more efficient.  
Even so, the value in the ability to communicate with the teammate directly did 
not go unnoticed and is noted by comments made by Participants 4 and 19. Almost all the 
participants agreed on the desire for voice communications and the potential added value 
that it may provide. Future research will examine the frequency and content of 
participant-teammate communications with the control station modified to also 
accommodate voice communications for information exchange. The use of missions with 
more dynamic, unexpected changes may also prompt more frequent communications to 
better evaluate the adequacy of communication interfaces. 
Human-Human vs. Human-Autonomy communications. There were 
significantly more messages sent in the Human-Human teams compared to the Human-
Autonomy teams. The lack of communication when working with an autonomous 
teammate may have been partially due to the frustration of not being able to communicate 
freely. Six of the twelve participants commented on how cumbersome it was to employ, 
as noted by Participant 6: “precise syntax/verbiage. Even though Human-Human teams 
communicated more, their corresponding mean objective performance score was not 





may at least partially explain the Human-Human team members increased mean trust and 
reliability perception ratings. 
Coordination and team cognition.  IMPACT’s interfaces, along with chat and 
voice messages issued in the station, were designed to better support human-autonomy 
teaming by informing team cognition, both team and task knowledge, and promoting 
communication and coordination between the operator and an autonomous teammate. 
IMPACT provides task information about what task needs to be completed (Task 
Manager, Figure 6), constraints taken into consideration (Play Workbook, Figure 7), and 
the plan for task completion (planned asset allocation is shown in Play Workbook, and 
the asset and route reflected on the map). Team information regarding the teammate’s 
status information and intentions are reflected in the Task Manager and Play Manager as 
well as various status indicators throughout the interfaces.  
The Task Manager interface was found to be useful with both team structures and 
regardless of whether the teammate was autonomous or human. Questionnaire ratings and 
comments indicated that the overall look and feel was effective as well as the interface’s 
functionality in supporting task management (e.g., knowing the tasks assigned to each 
team member and whether they have been completed or not). Along with the Active Play 
Manager and other play-based interfaces, participants indicated that they were able to 
have a clear understanding of their teammate’s status (team knowledge) and the state of 
task completion and resource availability (task knowledge). A few of these comments are 







Table 9. Comments regarding the Task Manager and Active Play Manager interfaces. 
 
Additionally, participants commented on how the Task Manager could be improved. 
Some feedback indicated a desire for a more salient indication of task priority, perhaps 
adding color-coding to the task icons in addition to the row locations used to differentiate 
task priority. Participants’ feedback also indicated that having more task status information 
would be useful in the Task Manager. Desired improvements include task progression status 
and a mechanism whereby all chat messages/information related to a specific task, beyond 
the initial chat that created the task (e.g., updates, all clears, etc.), are easily accessed.  
Teaming feedback. Teaming ratings used a Likert-scale ranging from 1 to 7, 
where a rating of 4 was considered neutral, a lower rating would be considered negative 
or lacking, and a rating greater than four would be considered positive. Overall, 
participants rated their ability to effectively communicate and coordinate with their 
teammate relatively high, along with their team cognition and role clarity. The mean 
ratings, regardless of team composition or team structure, were around six for 
communication/coordination, team cognition, and role clarity. These findings further 
support the notion that the interfaces supported some of the critical components of 
teaming.  
The only teaming component rating that was relatively low, with a mean rating 
less than five, was team perception (which measured how much participants perceived 
themselves to be part of a team versus working individually). This may be due to the low 
Participant Comment 
11 “I knew what tasks my teammate was currently working on.” 
15 “I was better able to understand what was going on.” 
16 “Made everything very clear.” 





number of communications discussed earlier, causing a sense of isolation. Additionally, 
team perception ratings did significantly differ: when mission complexity was low, team 
perceptions were lower for the Role-driven structure, which required less interaction 
between teammates compared to the Operator-driven structure. Unsurprisingly, this 
difference disappeared when the mission complexity was increased. This is most likely 
because the higher complexity created requirements for greater teammate interaction in 
order to complete the missions successfully.  
Human-Human vs. Human-Autonomy Teams 
The current research found no statistically significant performance differences 
between the Human-Human and Human-Autonomy teams. Previous research conducted 
by McNeese et al. (2018), had similar findings, with their human-autonomy teams 
performing as well as the novice all-human teams. These results echo the potential for an 
autonomous agent to fulfill the role of a teammate and complete tasks without negatively 
impacting the team’s performance or the operator’s workload and situation awareness. 
While the human-autonomy teaming outcomes appear to be promising, there are still 
hurdles that need to be overcome for true peer-to-peer teaming (Klein et al., 2004).  
Despite a lack of any Team Composition significant differences in performance, 
workload, or situation awareness, human teammates were perceived to be more 
trustworthy and reliable. Since there is no objective reasoning for the differences in the 
trust and reliability perceptions, this may reflect an inherent bias against autonomy that 
will need to be overcome. Madhavan & Wiegmann (2007) have reported on the subtle 
differences in trust between human teammates and autonomous teammates as well as the 





agents that may help to mitigate these differences. Additionally, this divergence in trust 
and perception of reliability may reflect a need for increased transparency into the 
autonomous teammate’s reasoning (Wortham & Theodorou, 2017). The source of the 
differences in trusting humans compared to autonomous teammates, as well as how to 
overcome such biases should be explored in future research. 
Having the appropriate level of trust, or calibrated trust, is important because of 
the implications it has on how much or how little the autonomy is used (Hoffman, 
Johnson, Bradshaw, & Underbrink, 2013). In theory, if the autonomy is trusted too much, 
it can lead to misuse and over-reliance. On the other hand, if the trust is too low, it could 
be underutilized (Parasuraman and Riley, 1997). Interestingly, despite ratings indicating 
that the autonomous teammate was trusted less, it was utilized that same amount as the 
human teammate in the present study. This may simply be because of the constrained UV 
resources, such that the human operator required the autonomous teammate’s support to 
complete all the taskings. Therefore, the task requirements may have negated any 
shortfalls in trust. However, this may not always be the case, and as the task and 
situational demands change, there is potential for the lack of trust to influence the use of 
the autonomous teammate, a phenomenon that should be considered in future system 
design.  
Limitations and Future Direction 
Ideally, participants would have had more time to interact with the complex 
system in order to learn its intricacies and become more confident in their own abilities. 
This would have also allowed participants further experience with their assigned 





system’s capabilities in novel ways. Unfortunately, due to time and budgetary constraints, 
training time was limited. However, pilot testing revealed that the core requirements for 
using the system and working with a teammate could be learned by a novice within the 
time allotted.  
In this study, as well as many others (e.g., McNeese et al., 2018), the autonomy 
and human teammates were capable of completing all the same tasks. Specifically, in the 
present study, the human teammate’s capabilities were constrained to match those 
provided by the autonomous teammate for experimental control. However, when 
IMPACT, a complex multi-UV control station, was employed in live tests, the possible 
actions of a human outnumbered those of an autonomous teammate. More advanced 
capabilities need to be developed in order for autonomy to truly take on the role of an 
equal teammate (Klein et al., 2004) and to enable comparisons of human and autonomous 
teammates that provide greater external validity for complex C2 domains. 
The need for autonomy advancements is further illustrated by the fact that a 
human confederate was employed in the present research to represent intelligent 
capabilities under development but are not fully implemented in the IMPACT system. In 
addition to having more advanced capabilities, intelligent agent technologies need to 
support reliable operation, provide better autonomy transparency, and support human-
autonomy collaboration (Johnson et al., 2014b). Ultimately, autonomy needs to exhibit 
stable performance in a range of operating conditions and mission events, notifying the 
human teammate when it is operating outside of its competency bounds, just as an 





For humans and autonomy to function as peer-to-peer teammates, they need to be 
able to establish a basic compact between the operator and agent, with both team 
members contributing to goal negotiation and actively participating in team collaboration, 
exercising bidirectional directability (Klein et al., 2004). Future research should explore 
additional missions and more complex taskings to help researchers address technological 
challenges for needed strategic capabilities and rapid, effective decision-making (United 
States Air Force, 2019) as wells as enable future research to explore more complex 
challenges such as varying automation reliability and increasing intricacies of the 
interdependencies between human operators and enhanced autonomous teammates. 
The use of more complex missions will help inform the refinement of interfaces 
to better support bidirectional communications between human-autonomy team members, 
including task negotiations between human and autonomy team members. Such 
developments are needed to realize more dynamic task distribution and trading that 
equalizes workload across the team and capitalizes on the capabilities of each team 
member. This would involve the design of new interfaces by which working agreements 
can be created to support task-sharing, which would help experimental evaluation of what 
conditions task swapping should be entertained or even automated.  
Related to the need to employ more complex missions, interface designs also need 
to take into consideration the scalability of various approaches to a larger number and 
mix of team members. As the number of players in a team increases, the structure of the 
relationships/roles of the team members becomes more complex, and communication and 
coordination demands are increased as well. Design efforts to improve collaboration 





also inform efforts that are addressing the vision of a well-situated team of multiple 
humans working together with multiple autonomous systems.  
Conclusion 
The IMPACT multi-unmanned vehicle simulation system was an effective 
platform to host this systematic evaluation of alternative (operator versus role-base 
driven) team structures for sharing task workload as well as the direct comparison of 
human-human teaming versus human-autonomy teaming. IMPACT’s comprehensive 
suite of play-based interfaces provided basic requirements to support key components of 
effective teams: communication, coordination, and team cognition. Moreover, the results 
of the present study indicate that the enhanced Task Manager supported coordinated task 
completion, and the participants’ comments identified ways it can be improved further. 
For these reasons, the IMPACT simulation proved to be an excellent testbed for the 
support of follow-on research to explore alternative teaming strategies as well as interface 
improvements to facilitate shared situation awareness and avoid coordination 
breakdowns.  
This research also illustrated that, in support of future research, parallel 
advancements are needed in both the autonomy’s capabilities as well as the operator 
interfaces. Refinement in both is essential (Kilgore & Voshell, 2014), especially with the 
vision of a human operator and intelligent agent dynamically collaborating to problem 
solve and share task completion in a manner similar to effective human teams. Still, it 
cannot be ignored that human-autonomy teams differ from human teams, and thus 
various approaches may be necessary when designing for interaction between humans 





communicates is fundamentally different from the way a human does, and these 
differences need to be considered when designing interfaces that provide transparency 
and explainability to the human teammate to better support the operator’s calibrated trust 
and promote team communication and cognition. Especially in human-autonomy teams, 
each member will bring different insights and knowledge to the team, and it may be these 
differences that allow the team to truly succeed in dynamic environments, but only if the 
team’s interactions are efficient (Cooke, 2015).  
Despite these challenges, the results of the present research are encouraging in 
that the performance measures from human-autonomy teams were at the same levels as 
those recorded with human-human teams. Additionally, the results from the Role-driven 
team structure, compared to Operator-driven, confirm that moving from supervisory 
control approaches for multi-UV management to human-autonomy teaming is not only 
viable but also beneficial. This research supports the USAF’s view on the importance of 
human-autonomy teaming, which “will be central to any development and use of 
[military automated systems]” (Zacharias, 2019). Human-autonomy teaming will 
continue to be an important area of focus for many years to come, while always working 
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Appendix A. Acronym List. 
AFRL Air Force Research Laboratory 
AI Artificial Intelligence 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
C2 Command and Control 
DoD Department of Defense 
EID Ecological Interface Design 
H-A Human-Autonomy 
H-H Human-Human 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
IMPACT Intelligent Multi-UxV Planner with Adaptive Collaborative/Control Technologies 
RAM Random Anti-terror Measure 
SA Situation Awareness 
SO Sensor Operator 
SUS System Usability Scale 
USAF United State Air Force 
UV Unmanned Vehicle 







Appendix B. List of Queries 
UV Queries (6 per scenario) 
- What is [a vehicle's] speed? 
- What is [a vehicle's] altitude? 
- What is [a vehicle] doing? 
- How long to get a [vehicle/sensor/weapon type] to a location? 
- Which vehicle is closest to [a location]? 
 
Situation Awareness Queries (6 per scenario) 
- How many RAMs have been completed? 
- How many [NBDEs/Intruder events] have there been?  
- Which tasks are [your/your teammate’s] current responsibility?  
- How many tasks have [you/your teammate] completed? 


















Appendix E. Task/Subtask Division & Participant Reference Guide 
 
Handout for Participants in Human-Human Team Composition 
[Note: Tasks the teammate could complete were bolded, and tasks they could not 
complete were grayed out. Being able to complete an item in the “task” row meant that 










Handout for Participants in Human-Autonomy Team Composition 
 [Note: Tasks the teammate could complete were bolded, and tasks they could not 
complete were grayed out. Being able to complete an item in the “task” row meant that 











Appendix F. Post-Mission Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions as they relate to the mission that you just 
completed. 
Mark the box () which best reflects your ratings for each of the following: 
1. What was your perceived mission difficulty utilizing this team structure? 
Easy   Neutral   Hard 
       
 
 
2. What was your perceived SELF-performance? (How well you believed you 
performed on the tasks that were your responsibility?)  
 
Poor   Average   Excellent 
       
 
3. What was your perceived TEAM performance? (How well do you believe your team 
performed together completing the missions?)  
Poor   Average   Excellent 
       
 
 
4. Situation Awareness:  For this trial, rate your overall situation awareness -- the 
degree to which you: were aware of the goals, your tasks, your teammate’s tasks, and 
the status of the vehicles and their tasking.  
Never 
Aware   Neutral   
Always 
Aware 




5. Trust:  For this trial, rate your trust in your teammate. (Were you confident that the 
teammate would complete their tasks and that they would accurately inform you of 
their status?)  
 
Low   Moderate   High 






For the following sections (6-9), please respond to each question using the following 
scale: 
 
6. Task Manager 
 How useful did you find the task manager? 
 Did the Task Manager make it easier to understand what your teammate was 
doing?  
 Did the Task manager aid in your ability to coordinate activities with your 
teammate?  
 
7. Team Perception 
 How much did you think of yourself as an individual as opposed to part of 
a group? 
 How much did you think of your teammate as a partner? 
 How much did you think of yourself as working collaboratively with your 
teammate? 
 How much did you think of yourself as working separately from your 
teammate? 
8. Reliability 













Not at all   Moderately   Extremely 





For the following sections (10-14), please rate your level of agreement with each 
statement using the following scale: 
9. Team Cognition 
 I understood my teammate’s capabilities and limitations. 
 I understood why my teammate took the actions that were made.  
 I was able to maintain awareness of my teammate’s actions and status.  
 My teammate’s actions were in line with my expectations. 
 My teammate and I were “on the same page” during the mission. 
10. Coordination and Communication  
 We coordinated our efforts well.  
 Our ability to coordinate our actions impacted our overall performance. 
 My teammate and I were able to effectively communicate. 
 My teammate provided me with the information needed to successfully 
complete the mission. 
 I was able to provide my teammate with the information they needed to 
succeed. 
11. Role Clarity  
 I knew exactly what I was supposed to do during the evaluation.  
 I understood fully which of my duties were more important than others.  
 My responsibilities were very clear and specific.  
 My teammate knew exactly what to do. 
 My teammate understood fully which duties were more important than 
others.  
 My teammate's responsibilities were very clear and specific. 
Disagree 
strongly   
Neither agree 
nor disagree   
Agree 
strongly 





Appendix G. Final Questionnaire 
Please answer the following questions comparing the two team structures (role-driven 
and operator-driven) that you experienced. 
Mark the box () which best reflects your ratings for each of the following: 
1. For which team structure was your perceived mission difficulty higher?  
Operator-driven 
more difficult 
  Neutral   Role-driven more difficult 
       
 
 
2. For which team structure was your perceived SELF-performance the higher?  
Operator-driven 
higher 
  Neutral   Role-driven higher 
       
 
3. For which team structure was your perceived TEAM performance higher?  
Operator-driven 
higher 
  Neutral   Role-driven higher 
       
 
4. Situation Awareness: For which team structure do you think you had a better overall 
awareness of the situation? 
Operator-driven 
more aware 
  Neutral   Role-driven more aware 
       
 












6. How would you divide tasks between you and your teammate considering their 







7. How would you divide tasks if you and your teammate had equal abilities (i.e., your 







8. Did the manner in which you had to communicate with your teammate affect your 

















10. Performance on task: Compare your team’s performance on each task between the 
two team structures (e.g., how often did you think you correctly answered 



























     
Complete 






















     
 













Please rate the following interfaces based on how much they affected your ability to 
effectively work with your teammate to complete the mission (i.e., how well they 
supported teaming between you and your teammate). Mark the box () which best 
reflects your ratings for each of the following interfaces: 
13. Task Manager (image of the interface on page 7) 
 
Greatly 
hindered   
Neutral/ 
no effect   
Greatly 
aided 









14. Active Play Manager (image of the interface on page 8) 
 
Greatly 
hindered   
Neutral/ 
no effect   
Greatly 
aided 

















15. The following statements are regarding the Task Manager tile. Please rate your level 
of agreement with each of the statements. Any additional comments are greatly 




Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
The overall “look 
and feel”/design of 
the Task Manager 
was effective 
     
General impression?  Design approach fairly intuitive/efficient?  Or approach 
seriously flawed with alternate approach needed? 
The task icons were 
intuitive/easy to 
decipher 
     






within the Task 
Manager 
     






Incoming tasks were 
easy to manage  
(e.g., Clear tasks 
out, assign tasks, 
complete tasks) 
     
What would you change or add? 
It was clear which 
tasks had been 
assigned to me and 
which tasks were 
assigned to my 
teammate 
     





It was clear which 
steps I needed to 
take/plays I needed 
to call in response to 
tasks 
     












16. Which Task Manager interface features did you find most useful? Which interface 











17. Should tasks that are completely the responsibility of your teammate (i.e., the 
teammate initiated ALL the steps/plays required in response to a task) appear in the 










18. Currently, the operator is required to manually remove (by hitting “X”) tasks from 
the Task Manager when a task is complete. Is this the preferred method, or would you 
rather the tasks to be automatically removed when all the steps of a task are 









19. Please use this space to note any additional comments you have about the design, 












Active Play Tile 
20. Which Active Play Tile features did you find most useful? Which interface features 






21. Please use this space to note any additional comments you have about the design, 
symbology, or functionality of the Active Play Tile. (e.g., what changes would make 














22. Please answer the following questions about the entire system. Circle a single 






I think that I would like to use this system frequently. 1        2        3        4       5 
I found the system unnecessarily complex. 1        2        3        4       5 
I thought the system was easy to use. 1        2        3        4       5 
I think that I would need the support of a technical person 
to be able to use this system. 1        2        3        4       5 
I found the various functions in this system were well 
integrated. 1        2        3        4       5 
I thought there was too much inconsistency in this system. 1        2        3        4       5 
I would imagine that most people would learn to use this 
system very quickly. 1        2        3        4       5 
I found the system very cumbersome to use. 1        2        3        4       5 
I felt very confident using the system. 1        2        3        4       5 
I needed to learn a lot of things before I could get going 




23. Please provide any additional comments concerning the experiment, training, tasks, 









Appendix H. Debrief Questions 
Final Debrief Guide 
[Note: The post-mission debrief was semi-structured. While all question categories were 
covered, the specific questions varied across participants. The questions listed below are 
provided as examples of the types of questions that were asked.] 
1. Teammate Questions 
a. [If part of Human-Autonomy condition] Although your teammate was 
representative of true autonomous capabilities, today, the role was fulfilled by 
another experimenter. Were you aware that your teammate was actually 
another human? If so, did this affect or actions/responses?  
b. What would you change about your teammate’s performance?  
c. Did your asset count factor into your performance? What if all assets were 
available to all team members? Would it cause frustration? Beneficial?  
d. What would cause you to talk to your teammate more? Did the interfaces and 
the information they provided influence your communications with your 
teammate?  
e. Would your behavior change if your teammate was human/autonomous? 
2. System Questions 
a. Did the system stability influence your responses to the questionnaires? Do 
you think the system’s performance influenced/affected you/your 
teammate’s/the team’s performance? 
b. Any comments about the overall system? Was it easy to find the information 
you needed? Any thoughts on the layout of the tiles/screen?  
c. Do you think the current interface/system would scale to enable you to work 
with multiple teammates?  
 
 
